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ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY AND JURISPRUDENCE 
JEROME HALL 
O NE of the greatest hindrances to 
the progress of philosophy is 
the difficulty of testing philo- 
sophical arguments in definite ways; 
as the old truism has it, a philosophy is 
not refuted, it merely loses its attrac- 
tion. It is, therefore, a matter of general 
significance that an appraisal of the ap- 
plication of analytic philosophy to ju- 
risprudence can be made in relatively 
precise, objective ways, since there is 
available, as a testing ground, an ad- 
vanced legal system with its profusion 
of concepts and well-known methods of 
elucidation. 
Among the diverse contributions to 
analytic philosophy, that of the late J. 
L. Austin has been recognized for its 
special relevance to jurisprudence. In 
describing his method of "doing philos- 
ophy," his colleague, J. 0. Urmson,1 
said that Austin worked with a group 
of scholars and that first they chose an 
"area of discourse" and selected terms 
and idioms that seemed significant, that 
is, that were interesting; this was done 
by free association, reading documents 
and books, not by philosophers, but, for 
example, the law reports of cases and 
books on psychology and, of course, the 
dictionary. Members of the group then 
gave examples of the correct and incor- 
rect use of these terms and, finally, an 
explanation of their use. 
On the face of it, there are several 
puzzles about this way of doing philos- 
ophy. In the first place, dictionaries are 
omnibus collections, and it would seem 
that one makes good use of their con- 
tents only if a problem or other guid- 
ing line is held in view. But while that 
makes the foray intelligible, it contra- 
dicts the alleged mode of selection.2 
There are also problems regarding the 
use of law reports. 
For example, in "A Plea for Excuses"3 
Austin sets out the report of Regina v. 
Finney, a case decided in 1874, in which 
the defendant, an attendant in an in- 
sane asylum, was tried for manslaugh- 
ter in that, being in charge of a patient 
who was taking a bath and thinking the 
patient had left the tub, he turned on 
the hot water instead of the cold, thus 
scalding the patient "to death." Austin 
makes two comments: (1) both the 
lawyers and the judge used a large num- 
ber of terms of excuse ("accident," 
"'negligence," "mistake") as though 
they were indifferent or equivalent or al- 
ternatives, when they are not; and (2) 
Justice Lush's instruction to the jury 
was "a paradigm of the faults,' while 
the defendant was a "master of the 
Queen's English." When one has recov- 
ered from his surprise at this preference 
for the speech of a male nurse over that 
of a High Court English judge and is in- 
formed that, under the law, the de- 
fendant could not have been convicted 
of manslaughter unless he was reckless 
in turning on the hot water, it is ap- 
parent that there was no reason, in the 
determination of that issue, to distin- 
guish "accident" from "negligence" and 
"mistake." 
If the purpose of "A Plea for Ex- 
cuses" was not to criticize the language 
14 
This content downloaded from 156.56.168.2 on Thu, 5 Feb 2015 15:09:30 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY AND JURISPRUDENCE 15 
of judges from a non-legal perspective 
but was, instead, to understand the use 
of legal terms, other difficulties are met. 
First, many ordinary words are used in 
a technical sense, and it requires a great 
deal of study, in effect a legal education, 
to understand how those terms are used. 
For example, burglary includes an "en- 
try," but the image summoned by ordi- 
nary speech-a man inside a house-is 
not the legal meaning of "entry." Part 
of a hand inside a window, engaged in 
raising it, a bullet shot into a room, and 
even a hole bored in the floor of a gran- 
ary, through which the grain drops into 
sacks held below the floor, are entries 
in the legal sense. The common-law def- 
inition of murder is killing a human be- 
ing with "malice aforethought"; but 
"malice" does not mean malice, and 
"aforethought" is not premeditation in 
the dictionary sense. The philosophical 
significance of lay criticism of a ran- 
dom selection of expressions from law 
reports is not immediately apparent. 
The pertinent question, however, 
does not concern the use of "philoso- 
phy" but the fact that there are differ- 
ent levels of discourse, which have dis- 
tinctive significance and functions. If 
we take constitutions, statutes, and de- 
cisions (case law) as the data of posi- 
tive law, we may distinguish the law- 
yer's elucidation of their terms and 
expressions from their elucidation by 
use of legal theories and legal philoso- 
phies. The analysis of a rule of criminal 
law, for example, containing "burgla- 
ry," consists partly in reducing it to its 
so-called material elements, namely, 
breaking, entry, dwelling house, night- 
time, and intent to commit a felony. 
Lawyers and judges work in relatively 
close proximity to the legal data and 
feel no great need to systematize their 
knowledge of a field of law. They are 
familiar with the "material" (essential) 
parts of the definitions of crimes, the 
causes of action, and the various de- 
fenses; and the case law is their au- 
thoritative dictionary. 
The legal theorist knows all this, but 
his interest extends beyond the average 
practitioner's knowledge. For him, the 
further elucidation of legal concepts de- 
pends on relevant theories, that is, or- 
ganized sets of propositions which in- 
terrelate the basic concepts so that the 
significance of each and, consequently, 
of every part of the law referred to is 
maximized. For example, a theory of 
criminal law, in which I have had some 
interest, is posited (a) on distinctions 
drawn among principles, doctrines, and 
rules; (b) on their interrelations; and 
(c) on the thesis that only voluntary 
conduct should be punishable.4 
The rules specify what is distinctive 
of each crime; they include verbs such 
as "burn," "kill," "carry away"; and, 
finally, they presuppose the "normal 
adult" and "normal conduct." The doc- 
trines comprise statements in terms of 
(a) infancy, insanity, intoxication, mis- 
take of fact or law, coercion, and neces- 
sity and also (b) in terms of attempt, 
solicitation, conspiracy, and complicity. 
It is doctrines of the first type, concern- 
ing incapacity or unusual situations, to 
which Austin and others refer as "ex- 
cuses"; the latter doctrines concern the 
degree of harm. It is necessary to see 
that the doctrines refer to common ele- 
ments of all the crimes and that the 
entire criminal law is defined by the ad- 
dition of all the doctrines to all the 
rules. Finally, if one examines this body 
of criminal law, comprised of the union 
of the rules and the doctrines, it will be 
seen that there are seven principles that 
underlie and permeate that legal struc- 
ture; they are stated in terms of legal- 
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ity, mens rea, act, the concurrence or 
fusion of mens rea and act (to form 
conduct), harm, causation (connecting 
conduct and harm), and punishment. 
Criminal-law theory not only con- 
structs the above concepts and draws 
the above distinctions, it also inter- 
relates the propositions that include 
those concepts. Something was said 
above about the interrelations of rules, 
doctrines, and principles; the principles 
are also interrelated to each other, that 
is, conduct to causing to harm, for 
which punishment must be imposed, 
all presupposing the framework of le- 
gality. Enough has been set out, it is 
hoped (and more will be said later), 
to indicate how the elucidation of terms, 
expressions, and questions by use of a 
legal theory is distinguished from the 
directly case-guided, unorganized elu- 
cidation of statutes and cases employed 
in the practice of law. It would seem to 
follow rather oddly, if Austin was "do- 
ing philosophy" in "A Plea for Ex- 
cuses," that some treatises on criminal 
law are more philosophical, in increas- 
ing understanding of the concepts dis- 
cussed there, than that essay; at least 
a test of that is available by comparing 
Austin's discussion of coercion, mistake, 
and act with that in English or Amer- 
ican texts on criminal law. 
If "doing philosophy" is only an ex- 
ercise in logic, it makes no difference 
whether the propositions one discusses 
include "burglary" or "mistake" or 
"right" or "law." But if there are im- 
portant differences among these levels 
of elucidation, and if the construction 
of patterns opens deeper layers of un- 
derstanding, one should draw relevant 
inferences about "philosophy." Accord- 
ingly, if we ascend from the level of a 
legal theory (i.e., from that of the legal 
theories of the various particular fields 
of law) to a still higher level, we enter 
the realm of legal philosophy. Here 
the central concept is that of "law" 
(as contrasted with that of criminal or 
contract or property law); and relevant 
subordinate concepts are designated by 
such terms as "right," "duty," "power," 
"privilege," and various other "funda- 
mental legal concepts." In sum, the 
lawyer's elucidation, legal theory, and 
legal philosophy represent progressive- 
ly higher levels of generalization; and 
it is equally important to keep in mind 
that each of these types of discourse is 
an elucidation of rules of positive law, 
that is, propositions that have both 
normative and descriptive significance. 
The elucidation of legal expressions 
by use of the above descriptive-norma- 
tive theory may be contrasted with an- 
other exercise in analytic philosophy, 
which will bring some of the above 
matters into sharper focus. In a recent 
symposium on responsibility, Professor 
Edgar Bodenheimer, a legal scholar, 
opposed the current thesis that pun- 
ishment is obsolete. In his discus- 
sion of punishment, he spoke of "re- 
quital for a wrong" and of a "blame- 
worthy act" deserving "disagreeable 
consequences." He recognized that 
"punishment" has various meanings, 
and he was careful to say that the term 
"will be used" by him in its moral 
sense; he noted that "this restricted 
meaning" conforms "with the popular 
notion of the term." 
His discussion was followed by that 
of Professor Joel Feinberg, who took 
exception to Bodenheimer's analysis 
"in one important respect," namely, he 
objected to the ethical connotation of 
Bodenheimer's definition of "punish- 
ment." He gave three examples of what, 
he said, "all of us would agree in identi- 
fying . . . as instances of legal punish- 
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ment"0-a traffic violation, the con- 
viction of a South African Caucasian 
for entertaining Negroes in his home 
in violation of law, and a conviction of 
murder. "All of them" he said, "are 
perfectly clear examples of legal pun- 
ishment . .. [they] are clear and non- 
controversial models of legal punish- 
ment."7 Like Bodenheimer, Feinberg 
recognized that "punishment" is am- 
biguous, but unmoved by the fact that 
a legal scholar preferred its moral con- 
notation, Feinberg rejected that: It has 
the disadvantages that "on this defini- 
tion many of the cases generally called 
punishment are not really instances of 
punishment at all, and this is true even 
of some of the standard examples of 
legal punishment."8 For example, de- 
spite the fact that the South African 
Caucasian who entertained Negroes in 
his home may have acted from "the 
highest moral purposes," "there is no 
question that he was punished for his 
act, and that his punishment was legal 
punishment."9 So, too, "of a man who 
violates . . . a business regulation of 
whose existence he was wholly un- 
aware.")10 He added that "the greatest 
drawback of a definition of 'legal pun- 
ishment' in moral terms is that it tends 
to obscure the discussion of the justi- 
fication of punishment and it invites 
equivocation"; but since he gave no 
reasons to support these assertions, 
they may be passed over. 
An immediate difficulty is that, on 
the face of the discussion, there are 
two linguistic facts, two "paradigm" or 
"standard" uses or cases, that seem 
directly opposed, namely, the popular 
use of "punishment" and the frequent 
use of "punishment" to cover the vari- 
ous cases put by Feinberg. Something 
more is therefore needed than the asser- 
tion of a linguistic preference. The 
statement that "we" and "all of us 
would agree in identifying as instances 
of punishment . . ." obviously excludes 
Bodenheimer and all others who hold 
that in its most important function 
"punishment" has a moral connotation 
and that clarity is also advanced if 
"punishment" is given that restricted 
meaning. "We" and "all of us" would 
exclude Socrates (who distinguished the 
Tyrants' "mere command" from law); 
those who espouse a natural-law philos- 
ophy; presumably Negroes of South 
Africa who do not recognize the dis- 
criminatory regulations as law; and, 
also, legal scholars who distinguish 
criminal law from quasi-offenses or 
mere violations. One may infer either 
that ordinary language is internally in- 
consistent or, more probably, that dif- 
ferent purposes and contexts are im- 
plied in different uses. 
Even if all scholars could be per- 
suaded to use "punishment" in one 
sense (a futile quest), this uniformity 
would hardly touch the difficult prob- 
lems of punishment that scholars try 
to solve. If one seeks more thorough 
elucidation of "punishment" than that 
provided by reference to an alleged 
"standard" use,'2 that can be had by 
consulting legal theories and the dis- 
cussions of philosophers. If this is done, 
one discovers many important facts, 
for example, that the moral connotation 
of "punishment," beginning with Aris- 
totle's Ethics, where "punishment" is 
restricted to voluntary harmdoing, has 
been elucidated in many thoughtful dis- 
cussions. He would also discover, as 
was noted above, that criminal-law 
theory interrelates punishment with 
other significant concepts; instead of 
asking how "punishment" is ordinarily 
used (which gives a variety of appar- 
ently contradictory answers), one elu- 
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cidates "punishment" by relating it to 
voluntary conduct, social harm, and 
causation and, also, by bringing that 
set of interrelations into the larger pat- 
tern of the interrelations of the prin- 
ciples, doctrines, and rules. 
We must now consider the question, 
noted above, regarding the variety of 
"laws" in modern legal systems, for 
example, murder, the South African 
case, traffic and technical business regu- 
lations, and inadvertent negligent be- 
havior. This question was discussed 
in an essay by H. L. A. Hart,'3 where 
he criticized the writer's theory of crim- 
inal law on grounds that indicate that 
much more than analysis is involved 
in analytic philosophy. 
In this essay, Hart criticizes the the- 
sis that mens rea, the central term in 
the basic principle of criminal liability, 
is the "intentional or reckless doing of 
a morally wrong act," and he criticizes 
especially the statement that "though 
mens rea differs in different crimes 
there is one common essential element, 
namely, the voluntary doing of a moral- 
ly wrong act forbidden by the law."'4 
Hart states that, if the above theory 
of criminal law "were merely a theory 
as to what the criminal law of a good 
society should be, it would not be pos- 
sible to refute it.... But of course Pro- 
fessor Hall's doctrine does not fit any 
actual system of criminal law because 
in every such system there are neces- 
sarily many actions . . . that if volun- 
tarily done are criminally punishable, 
although our moral code may be either 
silent as to their moral quality, or di- 
vided."'5 
The relevant facts are simple enough 
and require no legal competence to be 
understood. Our legal system includes 
strict liability, where punitive sanc- 
tions are imposed regardless even of 
thte degree of care taken, for example, 
if misbranded food or drugs are inno- 
cently shipped from a factory; there 
are penalties for inadvertent negligent 
behavior, and every legal system re- 
flects an inevitable accretion of archa- 
ic laws. But the further fact is that 
almost the whole corpus of the common 
law of crimes and a vast array of seri- 
ous statutory crimes all require mens 
rea as a basic condition of liability. 
In view of the practical consequences 
and for everyday purposes, one defini- 
tion of "criminal law" is understand- 
ably focused only on the punitive sanc- 
tion, and another definition is even 
more formal than that, specifying only 
the criterion that the relevant legal pro- 
ceedings are instituted and controlled 
by the state. When Stephen wrote 
his treatise a century ago, he was im- 
pressed by the diversity of laws to 
which punitive sanctions were applied 
as well as by even that of the many 
crimes in which mens rea was required. 
He therefore maintained that there was 
no mens rea; there are only mentes 
reae, that is, a multiplicity of the 
"states of mind" indicated by the va- 
riety of rules and statutes. This led to 
the formality that mens rea is whatever 
state of mind or absence of any state 
of mind (inadvertent negligence) is ex- 
pressed in any proscription by the sov- 
ereign of any conduct or any behavior, 
so long as that was sanctioned by "pun- 
ishment." There were other deficiencies 
in the current views of criminal law, 
for example, the lack of appreciation 
of the significance of "harm" and "cau- 
sation" and, above all, the lack of any 
system or definite organization of the 
fundamental concepts. 
For the indicated reasons, a theory 
of criminal law was constructed which, 
while it does "not fit" the whole of "any 
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actual system of criminal law" (if 
criminal law" is employed in the rela- 
tively formal sense noted above), does 
fit the most important part of that law 
((thus formally defined)-"importance" 
referring to the predominant signifi- 
(cance of the common law of crimes and 
:a vast body of statutory law marked 
Iby the gravity of the harm and the se- 
verity of the punishment. By adhering 
to a descriptive-normative meaning of 
A"mens rea, it thus became possible to 
(construct a theory that encompassed 
what everyone recognizes as criminal 
law (as contrasted with "quasi-of- 
fenses" and "public torts" that scholars 
apply to strict liability violations), 
which is indeed the basic criminal law 
of all advanced legal systems. That is 
the theory previously described in 
terms of certain principles, doctrines, 
and rules. 
Far from being merely of academic 
significance, the theory not only con- 
forms to the judges' preferences ex- 
pressed in centuries of decision"' but 
also maximizes the resourcefulness of 
lawyers in dealing with offenses that do 
not fall within the orbit of the theory; 
and the judges' interpretation of stat- 
utes also shows innumerable efforts to 
narrow or circumvent statutes whose 
literal terms oppose the principle of 
mens rea. Some of the most important 
recent decisions of the U.S. Supreme 
Court, for example, their recognition, 
as defenses, of ignorance of a city or- 
dinance'7 and ignorance by a bookseller 
of the obscene contents of certain 
books,'8 were based on the statutes' 
contradiction of the mens rea principle. 
So, too, the fact that offences subjected 
to strict liability (foreign legal systems 
require at least negligence as the con- 
dition of liability) have been called 
"public torts," etc., by many scholars 
also reveals the significance and influ- 
ence of a descriptive view of criminal 
law.'9 In sum, by distinguishing among 
the proscriptions - ordinarily called 
"criminal laws," it became possible to 
construct a theory that not only fits a 
very large and most important part of 
them but also lays the groundwork for 
an organized knowledge of them; and 
the theory also supplies a firmly estab- 
lished vantage point from which to crit- 
icize and improve "laws" that do not 
conform to the specified standards and 
criteria. It may be added that the fact 
that a theory covers only certain data, 
but not others, is characteristic of all 
theories; hence, the way to refute a 
theory is to construct a different theory 
which, with at least equal significance, 
covers those data as well as other data. 
The above descriptive-normative the- 
ory of criminal law is posited not only 
on mens rea but also on the further ef- 
fort ("act") characteristic of the volun- 
tary conduct that produced the harm; 
on causation, in the sense of authorship; 
on harm viewed as a social disvalue; 
and on punishment, interpreted in its re- 
lation to those descriptive-normative 
concepts. When these notions are 
brought into significant interrelations, 
each of them gains in significance; the 
same kind of advance in understanding 
and elucidation that is represented by 
theories of physical science, as opposed 
to the early ad hoc trial and error aided 
by a conglomeration of unorganized 
doctrines, is also reflected in a the- 
ory of a branch of law. 
"In the abstract," the analytic phi- 
losophy of excuses might take account 
of such theories. But this would require 
a neutral analysis that is not character- 
istic of that philosophy, whose meta- 
physical preferences resemble those of 
Ryle's Concept of Mind (1949).20 He 
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said there that in "ordinary employ- 
ment" "we discuss whether someone's 
action was voluntary or not only when 
the action seems to have been his fault. 
. . . In the same way in ordinary life 
we raise questions of responsibility 
only when someone is charged, justly 
or unjustly, with an offense." "But phi- 
losophers," he added, "tend to describe 
as voluntary not only reprehensible but 
also meritorious actions, not only things 
that are someone's fault but also things 
that are to his credit."' He later added 
that sometimes "we oppose things done 
voluntarily to things suffered under 
compulsion." But this, he said, is only 
to decide whether a person did some- 
thing or whether it was done to him.22 
Again, one finds a preference for a par- 
ticular usage and neglect of the fact 
that ordinary speech includes the use 
of "voluntary" and "responsibility" in 
a meritorious sense, for example, "his 
fasting, when rations were short, was 
voluntary"; "the suspect voluntarily 
came to the police station"; the citation 
read, "Private X voluntarily took up 
his post at the most dangerous point"; 
and similar uses of "responsibility" 
could be stated. "Voluntary" is closely 
associated with "freedom"; and "free- 
dom" in the sense of capacity or power 
to do what one wants to do is as com- 
mon or "standard" as is "freedom 
from coercion."23 There is, also, the 
difference between freedom of choice 
and freedom of action. The former is 
a matter of knowledge and is therefore 
enlarged by education. A relevant first- 
person report might be: "I knew what 
I wanted. I decided to do X. I sensed 
the effort I was making and my ability 
to achieve my goal." 
With these various linguistic uses in 
view, one can more readily apprehend 
the thrust of Hart's well-known essay, 
"The Ascription of Responsibility and 
Rights,"24 where he states, "There are 
in our ordinary language sentences 
whose primary function is not to de- 
scribe things . . . or anything else, nor 
to express or kindle . . . emotions, but 
to . . . claim rights . . . recognize rights 
. . . ascribe rights . .. transfer rights . . . 
and also to admit or ascribe or make 
accusations of responsibility." His 
"main purpose" is to show that such 
statements as "he did it" are not de- 
scriptive but ascriptive; their function 
is "to ascribe responsibility for actions." 
Although Hart speaks of the "primary" 
function of such expressions, his pur- 
pose is plain-he wishes to prove that 
certain concepts are not descriptive.25 
At the outset, there are difficulties in 
the way of speaking of the ascription 
of responsibility for an action. The 
statement "he did it" (which Hart em- 
ploys) serves to identify a person; 
moreover, we speak of being respon- 
sible for an effect, for example, a harm, 
not for one's acting. But, since these 
questions have been discussed by oth- 
ers,26 it is necessary here to add only 
that the ascription of responsibility for 
a criminal harm presupposes the com- 
petence or normality of the actor and 
the fact that he produced (caused) that 
harm. The ascription of responsibility, 
in the sense of imputing or imposing 
liability, is only the last stage of an 
inquiry which must have been preceded 
by the factual determinations of com- 
petency and causation. It is possible, 
of course, to draw a hard line between 
these facts and the imposition of liabil- 
ity ("ascription of responsibility"), but 
this only ignores the close relationship 
between the facts and the judgment. 
The judgment is obviously not a de- 
scription of the above facts in the or- 
dinary sense of "description," say, in 
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terms of a color. But the facts of com- 
petency and causation and the judg- 
ment are so closely connected that the 
latter "fits" or is "apt" or "correct" 
only by reference to the former. It 
hardly suffices merely to assert that 
the ascription of responsibility is not 
descriptive. 
That legal expressions which include 
such terms as "contract," "murder," 
and "responsible" are partly ascriptive 
is common opinion; nor would Austin's 
discovery that such statements as "I 
promise" and "I agree" are "performa- 
tory" be news to any law student or to 
anyone who has made an agreement. 
Hart's thesis, however, extends far be- 
yond the boundary of disputes regard- 
ing ethical judgments and the imputa- 
tion of liability. As noted, he argues 
that statements regarding action, such 
as "he did it," are ascriptive, not de- 
scriptive, and he carries this to the 
point of maintaining that "intention," 
"mens rea," and "voluntary" are also 
only ascriptive. There is, of course, no 
necessary connection between the two 
positions, and a philosopher might well 
hold that "intention" is descriptive of 
a mental state and also that a moral 
judgment is not descriptive. 
The present issue, then, is narrowed 
to the question whether the legal terms 
Hart discusses, especially "mens rea" 
(criminal intention) and "voluntary," 
are descriptive or explanatory or any- 
thing else, as well as ascriptive. Hart 
does not consider that there may be 
crucial differences between contract 
and criminal law, and he applies his 
thesis of ascription equally to both. 
But it is well known that in some the- 
ories of contract law and, perhaps, in 
the prevailing view, "meeting of the 
minds" is given a wholly external mean- 
ing, which, as will appear more fully, 
is not normally the case in criminal law 
as regards "intention" and "voluntary." 
Hart states that legal concepts such 
as contract, murder, voluntary, inten- 
tion, and act are "defeasible," and he 
speaks of "this characteristic of legal 
concepts."27 But what he refers to is 
that certain excuses "can defeat a claim 
that there is a valid contract."28 This 
confusion between defeating a claim 
and the concept of the claim itself runs 
through his discussion, with unfortu- 
nate consequences, as does his later con- 
fusion of a prosecutor's charge with the 
concept of the crime charged; but ei- 
ther a crime was committed, that is, all 
the essential elements were present, or 
the contrary is true.29 
Discussing "contract," Hart notes 
that a plaintiff's claim can be opposed 
by a denial of the facts or, more im- 
portant for his purpose, by a plea of 
exception or excuse, for example, mis- 
representation, undue influence, lunacy, 
etc. (and, he might have added, by ad- 
mission of the facts but submission that 
they do not comprise a cause of action). 
He grants that philosophers (he might 
have added legal scholars)30 have sup- 
plied relevant formulas and that Pol- 
lock, an authority on contract law, said, 
"The consent must be true, full and 
free."'3' "But," states Hart, "such a 
general formula may be profoundly 
misleading [for whom, is not specified], 
for the positive looking doctrine, 'con- 
sent must be true, full and free' is only 
accurate as a statement of the law if 
treated as a compendious reference to 
the defenses"; it "is therefore, in fact, 
to say that defenses such as undue 
influence and coercion, and any others 
which should be grouped with them, 
are admitted."32 And, for Hart, the 
practice of law "makes this clear," 
since he believes the plaintiff must not 
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prove that there was "true, full and 
free" consent. 
But this confuses legal procedure 
with the significance of that procedure 
when it is combined with the assump- 
tion of normal capacity and normal 
action, upon which it rests. For ex- 
ample, everywhere in criminal law it 
is also assumed that the defendant was 
sane, and it would be absurd to require 
the prosecution to prove in every case 
that the defendant was sane. When a 
plea of insanity is raised, in most of 
the states, the prosecution must prove 
that the defendant was sane when he 
acted, while elsewhere, including Eng- 
land, the defense must prove insanity; 
if it fails, the verdict "guilty" implies 
that the requisite mens rea was present. 
Similarly, one who sues for breach of 
contract must prove certain actions and 
conditions (offer, acceptance, and con- 
sideration) that are assumed to be nor- 
mal until that is controverted by the 
defense. If the jury finds for the plain- 
tiff, its verdict rests on the preponder- 
ance of his evidence that the conditions 
were normal; the finding of normal 
consent is necessarily an inference, 
drawn from the external facts inter- 
preted in the light of the jurors' experi- 
ence. 
Applying his thesis to the criminal 
law, Hart states that "attempts to de- 
fine in general terms 'the mental con- 
ditions' of liability . . . are only not mis- 
leading if their positive and general 
terms are treated merely as a restate- 
ment or summary of the fact that var- 
ious heterogeneous defenses or excep- 
tions are admitted."33 Then he states 
a very different thesis: "What is meant 
by the mental element in criminal lia- 
bility meanss rea)," he now says, "is 
only to be understood by considering 
certain defenses or exceptions, such as 
Mistake of Fact, Accident, Coercion, 
Duress, Provocation, Insanity, Infan- 
cy."134 For, plainly, to state that one 
must consider the excuses in order to 
understand mens rea (which, of course, 
is granted) is far from stating that 
mens rea is only "a restatement or sum- 
mary of . . . various heterogeneous de- 
fenses." Hart then states that, "in pur- 
suit of the will-o'-the-wisp of a general 
formula, legal theorists have sought to 
impose a spurious unity . . . upon 
these heterogeneous defenses . . . sug- 
gesting that they are admitted as mere- 
ly evidence of the absence of some 
single element ('intention'). . . . And 
this is misleading because what the 
theorist misrepresents as evidence neg- 
ativing the presence of necessary men- 
tal elements are, in fact, multiple cri- 
teria or grounds defeating the allega- 
tion of responsibility."35 But this does 
not consider the possibility (the current 
"standard" usage) that the reason for 
excusing a person ("defeating the alle- 
gation of responsibility") is that he 
lacks a required mens rea (i.e., the two 
go together); hence it is arbitrary to 
formulate the issue in terms of either 
necessary mental element or defeat of 
responsibility. Hart does not discuss 
any functional difference between 
"evidence negating . . ." and "grounds 
defeating . . ."; instead, after a dubious 
use of Aristotle,36 he acknowledges: 
"It is, of course, possible to represent 
the admission of these different de- 
fences or exceptions as showing that 
there is a single mental element ('vol- 
untariness') . . . required as necessary 
mental conditions meanss rea) of full 
criminal liability."37 But he reaffirms 
his thesis that "mens rea" is not de- 
scriptive, that it only excludes excuses. 
Of course, mens rea excludes the ex- 
cuses. But this does not prove that 
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mens rea has no descriptive or positive 
normative function. That it has such 
functions in the theory of criminal law 
discussed above is evident from the 
fact that the principles, including that 
of mens rea, are derived, not from the 
doctrines (excuses) alone, but from 
the doctrines added to the rules (which, 
it will be recalled, are stated in terms 
of the intentional or reckless commis- 
sion of certain harms). Thus mens rea 
does not mean only that the excuses 
were excluded; its meaning is also that 
the defendant intentionally or reck- 
lessly did what the rules proscribe. A 
criminal act is the fusion of a mens rea 
with the effort required to effect the 
harm, for example, "A intentionally 
shot B." To say that A was not insane, 
did not think B was a deer, and was 
not threatened by anyone does not wipe 
the slate clean; it leaves A's action, 
proscribed by the rule. Thus, the ex- 
cuses resemble negative concepts which 
necessarily presuppose positive ones- 
mistake presupposes correct percep- 
tion, insanity, sanity, and so on. The 
exclusion of the excuses presupposes 
the normality of the defendant and his 
conduct; "mens rea" is descriptive of 
his mental state, and that principle 
also expresses disapproval of his con- 
duct. 
The rules are more important than 
the doctrines in that they imply the 
normal condition; and it is therefore 
possible to conceive of a (primitive) 
legal system that consisted only of 
rules but not of one that consisted only 
of doctrines (excuses). For an enumer- 
ation of all the excuses would still leave 
it necessary to state, whenever no ex- 
cuse was accepted, that a person is li- 
able because he voluntarily committed 
a proscribed harm. Nor will it do to 
say that the exclusion of excuses im- 
plies only that the defendant is liable, 
since there is no such thing as "liability 
in the air"; in daily life, as in law, it is 
necessary to answer the question- 
liable for what? The rules, not the 
doctrines or their exclusion, answer 
that question. 
In everyday experience and in many 
psychologies and philosophies, "action" 
implies thinking, planning, the antici- 
pation of an end to be achieved, the vis- 
ualization of a change in a state of af- 
fairs, and, of course, the effort required 
to effect a plan. Law builds on that 
ordinary experience, and most cases 
turn on denials of the asserted facts 
(the rules). Nothing is said about mis- 
take, insanity, coercion, etc.; if the 
premise of normal conduct is not chal- 
lenged, the mens rea is found as a mat- 
ter of course, as implied in the verdict 
of guilt. In a minority of the cases an 
excuse is pleaded, and the prosecution 
must not only refute the plea, it must 
also prove that the defendant did cer- 
tain things. Suppose the defendant 
simply denies having done what is 
charged, for example, pleads an alibi 
or mistaken identity. Discussion of the 
excuses would be irrelevant, and their 
exclusion could not possibly lead any- 
one to conclude that he had committed 
the crime. And if those pleas (alibis, 
etc.) were rejected, the mens rea would 
characterize that defendant's action 
just as it does if a plea of insanity or 
mistake is rejected.38 
Instead of arguing that "mens rea" 
functions only to exclude excuses, it 
would be correct and persuasive to ar- 
gue that the acceptance of an excuse 
functions to exclude mens rea. But this 
does not imply that the excuses are 
mere formulas or functions. On the 
contrary, it is because an excuse is de- 
scriptive of a mental state and relevant 
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abnormal conduct that it functions to 
exculpate. Thus, if the purpose of the 
analytic philosophers' treatment of ex- 
cuses was to exorcise mental states, 
they have employed concepts that are 
inconsistent with that purpose. So, fi- 
nally, pleas of excuse are just as "de- 
feasible" as the claim that a contract 
was made or the charge that a certain 
crime was committed; the jury may 
not believe the defense. 
The influence of Ryle on the lin- 
guistic analysis of excuses is obvious- 
to substitute "pleas of excuse" for "ex- 
pressions of theories" is simple enough. 
While Ryle's emphasis on the expres- 
sion of theories rather than on their 
discovery or construction gave some 
plausibility to his identification of 
thinking and talking, that is hardly 
available as regards legal excuses. For 
a discussion of those excuses cannot 
avoid the rules of law and their refer- 
ence to mental states, since excuses 
cannot be understood unless one under- 
stands what is to be excused. 
Long before Ryle's verbal behavior- 
ism,39 Watsonian behaviorism and that 
of his successors in psychology had 
stimulated legal realists and others to 
discover ways of dispensing with men- 
tal states. They floundered on the rocks 
of criminal law and other branches of 
law which are intelligible only if men- 
tal states are considered. The external 
behavior of an intentional killer, a neg- 
ligent one, and a mistaken one might 
be identical. The significant differences 
are ascertainable only by discovery of 
the respectively different states of mind, 
for example, whether putting a spoon- 
ful of sugar into another person's cup 
of tea was an innocent act or an attempt 
to kill. Of course, an inference regard- 
ing another's state of mind must be 
based on observable actions or on talk, 
including confession; but the actor can 
immediately disclose his state of mind. 
It is also true that one makes many de- 
cisions that are never carried out; only 
he has knowledge of those mental 
states.40 Thus dependence on external 
action in fact-finding and the existence 
of internal states are very different mat- 
ters. 
A way of doing philosophy is judged 
by its product; hence the conclusions 
reached above are bound to influence 
one's estimate of the methods employed 
in the application of analytic philoso- 
phy to jurisprudence. Yet methods are 
sometimes valued in themselves, apart 
from any aesthetic quality or interest. 
Hart discussed his way of doing juris- 
prudence in an essay intended to eluci- 
date the use of "right" and "corpora- 
tion." In his view, the use of these 
terms "is not understood because com- 
pared with most ordinary words these 
legal words are . . . anomalous," by 
which he means that words like "corpo- 
ration" and "right" "do not have the 
straightforward connection with coun- 
terparts in the world of fact" that most 
ordinary words have. 
In trying to understand Hart's meth- 
od, one must first contrast it with the 
theories he dismisses: (1) that a word 
stands for an unexpected or complex or 
psychological fact, for example, the 
American legal realists' theory that a 
right is a term used in predicting the 
behavior of judges; (2) that a right is a 
fiction, standing for no fact (the Scan- 
dinavian realists' theory); (3) that a 
right stands for something (a corpora- 
tion-) different from other things just in 
that we cannot touch it, hear it, see it, 
feel it (a "now unfashionable" theo- 
ry)41; and (4) the (nominalist) license 
to define words as one pleases since this 
"trivializes" the questions asked about 
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"law" and "right." 
He then describes his method of "elu- 
cidation" by explaining how a game of 
cards is played-its rule regarding the 
highest card, that a particular player 
"scores a point," and so on-and he 
concludes, "in these circumstances that 
player is said to have 'taken a trick.'" 
This, he says, is not providing a syn- 
onym; it elucidates the use of the above 
expression by specifying the conditions 
under which the whole sentence is true 
and by showing how it is used in draw- 
ing a conclusion from the rules in a par- 
ticular case. And he concludes: 
I would therefore tender the following as an 
elucidation of the expression "a legal right": 
(1) a statement of the form "X has a right" 
is true if the following conditions are satisfied: 
(a) There is in existence a legal system. 
(b) Under a rule or rules of the system some 
other person Y is, in the events which have 
happened, obliged to do or abstain from some 
action. 
(c) This obligation is made by law depend- 
ent on the choice of X or some person author- 
ized to act on his behalf so that either Y is 
bound to do or abstain from some action only 
if X (or some authorized person) so chooses 
or alternatively only until X (or such person) 
chooses otherwise. (2) A statement of the form 
"X has a right" is used to draw a conclusion 
of law in a particular case which falls under 
such rules.42 
In the first place, one must ask, are 
legal terms anomalous in the above 
sense? Do they differ, in the way Hart 
states, from ordinary terms? Hart's or- 
dinary term is "table," hence it is im- 
mediately apparent that he is compar- 
ing a very narrow concept of perception 
with a high-level jurisprudential con- 
ception. (What would result from a 
comparison of "legal right" with "mat- 
ter" or "beauty"?) It is also implied 
that ordinary terms and legal terms are 
sharply separable, but "table" may be 
a legal term, for example, if a park reg- 
ulation forbids sitting on tables and 
there are flat pieces of furniture that 
are higher than benches but lower than 
the tables used at meals by people on 
picnics. Hart also oversimplifies the 
problem of elucidating words that have 
"counterparts in the world of fact." He 
assumes that the ordinary definition of 
"table" suffices to understand its use 
but that, as regards legal concepts, "we 
are puzzled when we try to understand 
our own conceptual apparatus."43 But 
epistemological controversies regarding 
perception raise many puzzles, and con- 
siderable sophistication is required to 
understand such statements as "there is 
a table."44 To assume that we immedi- 
ately understand such statements but 
that a lengthy analysis is required to 
understand "X has a right" is to pre- 
judge both problems and to cloud un- 
derstanding the one by arbitrarily con- 
trasting it with understanding the other. 
Nor is the specification of conditions, 
necessary to the "truth" of an expres- 
sion, peculiar to the elucidation of 
statements that include legal terms. 
Every expression, to be intelligible, re- 
quires its inclusion in a context; and to 
elucidate propositions about tables to 
persons of a very different culture, one 
should specify that people do not spread 
cloths on the floor or place food on it 
or squat on benches, etc. Thus, if 
"truth" has a logical connotation, what 
Hart says about the "truth" of legal ex- 
pressions applies to all expressions that 
are implications of certain propositions; 
for example, one could formulate a ma- 
jor and a minor premise that implied 
"this is a table." 
The terms "true," "existence," "legal 
system," "rule," "obliged," and "obli- 
gation," are among the most "anoma- 
lous" terms in the language. Thus, Hart 
began with one anomalous term, "legal 
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right," and his elucidation of it ended 
with six anomalous terms. It will also 
be noticed that his demonstration hangs 
on an "if"-if there is a legal system, if, 
under a rule and so on, then it is "true" 
to say "X has a right." The logic may 
be impeccable, but it supplies neither 
evidence nor reasons that support the 
conditions; the "truth" of the conclu- 
sion "X has a right" is necessarily and 
equally hypothetical.45 
Every analytical jurist from John 
Austin to Kelsen has discussed legal 
rules and legal rights in relation to a 
legal system. Kelsen has long included 
the choice of the plaintiff, in instituting 
legal action, in his notion of the "delict" 
that requires the imposition of the sanc- 
tion, and thus explains the plaintiff's 
right. Hohfeld, building on Terry and 
other notable predecessors, drew impor- 
tant distinctions among the various uses 
of "right." If Hart has added anything 
to our understanding of the use of "X 
has a legal right," the increment has 
not been recognized by some very able 
legal scholars.46 Apparently, it does not 
advance jurisprudence to regard theory 
as an "incubus."47 On the contrary, 
some definite evidence was given above, 
it is hoped, to reveal the significance of 
the "strong and persistent desire to see 
how the various aspects of experience 
hang together [which] is perhaps the one 
characteristic common and peculiar to 
philosophers."IT 
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